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STANDING AND ADVERSENESS IN
CHALLENGES OF TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR
DISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE SCHOOLS
THOMAS MCCOY * and
NEAL DEVINS **
INTRODUCTION
T HE issue of tax exemptions for segregated private schools is one
that causes courts to abandon normal standards of judicial re-
straint. The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, seem unusu-
ally inclined to supply legislative judgments on this issue in the ab-
sence of congressional action and to ignore or revise judgments made
by the legislature that the courts find unappealing. The question may
appear to the courts to be a vestige of the Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion era of "simple" segregation cases, thus calling forth the same
judicial activism that produced otherwise inexplicable decisions.' In a
moment of judicial candor, Judge Skelley Wright has stated that
judges:
should be more reluctant than we have been to fault the other
agencies of government and also more hesitant about filling the
void when, in our judgment, the elected branches of government
should have acted and failed. [But there is] one important excep-
tion: the area of equal rights for disadvantaged minorites. As to
that, I remain an uncompromising "activist." 2
In any event, the Supreme Court and several lower federal courts in
these tax-exemption cases have played fast and loose with two consti-
tutional doctrines that define and limit the scope of judicial authority
in our governmental structure. These doctrines, grounded in tradi-
tional Anglo-American notions about the role of the judiciary, are the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; B.S. 1964, Xavier University; J.D.
1967, University of Cincinnati; LL.M. 1968, Harvard University.
•* Director of Project on Religious Liberty and Private Education, Vanderbilt
Institute for Public Policy Studies; B.A. 1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982,
Vanderbilt University. Mr. Devins' research is supported by a grant from the Insti-
tute for Educational Affairs, but the views expressed are his own. The authors wish
to acknowledge the assistance of Gary A. Kurtz, whose research on the elusive topic
of "standing" contributed significantly to the preparation of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967) (enactment of
statute giving seller of property complete discretion in choosing his buyer constitutes
state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (adopting broad interpreta-
tion of state action to include judicial enforcement of private agreements).
2. Rabkin, Behind the Tax-Exempt Schools Debate, 68 Pub. Int. 21, 34 (Sum-
mer 1982).
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requirements of standing and adverseness, 4 which are essential pre-
requisites to the existence of a justiciable article III "case or contro-
versy."5 The requirement of standing insures that the plaintiff has a
personal stake in the controversy, 6 and prevents him from employing
"a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances
about the conduct of government."7 The related requirement of ad-
verseness assures that litigation between the parties is necessary and
timely, and at the same time guarantees that the court will hear the
best presentation that can be made for each side.8 The Supreme Court
has stated unequivocally that the duty of every judicial tribunal:
3. Standing requires that the party seeking relief suffer injury in fact and that
the interest sought to be protected be within the zone of interests protected by the
constitutional provision invoked. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1982); Gladstone,
Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970); L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law § 3-17 (1978); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 450, 456 (1970).
4. The relationship between adverseness and standing is often confusing because
the requirements substantially overlap in the evaluation of the plaintiff's position in
the case. Adverseness is the broader requirement in the sense that it encompasses both
the plaintiff and the defendant. If either is not sufficiently interested in resisting the
claims of the other, there is a lack of adverseness and thus a lack of the required case
or controversy. Some judicial discussions of standing have implied that adverseness
has become simply one element of standing. While this conclusion seems accurate
with respect to the plaintiff's role in a case, it overlooks the independent requirement
of an adverse defendant. "[I]f one party agrees with the position taken by the other,
there is no case or controversy withing the meaning of article III." L. Tribe, supra
note 3, § 3-15. The requirement of adverseness recognizes that it takes at least two
parties to create a genuine controversy. The adverseness requirement finds expression
in a variety of forms. See id. §§ 3-9 to 3-16. The court may not issue advisory
opinions. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911). The controversy must be ripe for judicial
resolution. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 & n.22
(1947). Changes in the positions of the parties or the lapse of time must not have
made the case moot. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 814, 816 (1969). See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. The discussion of
adverseness in this Article focuses on several cases in which one party came to agree
with the other party and, in some instances, took action to formally have the case
declared moot before judicial review. See infra pt. II.
5. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968); see L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 3-7.
While presentation of a case in an adversary context is required by the text of article
III, it has been argued that standing is not a constitutional prerequisite. Id. § 3-18;
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
Yale L.J. 816, 818 (1969).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
7. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968); see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223-24 (1974); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 3-19;
Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law
Method, 57 B.U.L. Rev. 807, 823 (1977).
8. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220-21
(1974); Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 827. The adverseness requirement is grounded in
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is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are
actually controverted in the particular case before it .... No stipu-
lation of parties or counsel, whether in the case before the court or
in any other case, can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the
court in this regard."
Not surprisingly, many litigants dissatisfied with the results of the
legislative process on the question of tax exemptions have encouraged
the federal courts to ignore these basic restrictions on their power to
supply or revise legislative judgments. Minority plaintiffs and civil
rights activists, unhappy with a seemingly insufficient committment
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the goal of public school
integration, have sought to use the courts to force the IRS to restrict
the tax benefits previously available to racially discriminatory private
schools.10 More recently, some litigants have urged the courts to pro-
hibit the Reagan administration's IRS from adopting less restrictive
policies than those implemented by the IRS under previous adminis-
trations. 11
The inclination of the federal courts to ignore or casually dismiss
standing and adverseness problems in their rush to address the merits
of tax-exemption cases has left a jumble of confusing and contradic-
tory precedents on the standing and adverseness issues. In what osten-
sibly is an attempt to remedy this situation, the Supreme Court re-
cently heard oral argument specifically on the standing question in the
tax-benefit case of Wright v. Regan.12 Some doctrinal clarity on the
issue, however belated, would be most welcome. But the history of
judicial disregard for justiciability standards in these cases gives cause
for skepticism about the Supreme Court's intentions in Wright, and
the fundamental separation of powers notion that legislative choices should be made
by Congress rather than by the judiciary. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-96 (1968);
L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 3-7. It has been stated that standing is also designed to
further the separation of powers notion. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 753-54 (1972) (app. to opinion of Douglas, J.,
dissenting (quoting excerpts from oral argument of Solicitor Gen. Griswold)); A.
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 122-23 (1962). But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 100 (1968) ("The question [of standing] does not, by its own force, raise separa-
tion of powers problems .... "); Davis, supra note 3, at 469 (the law of standing
should not be employed to limit the kinds of cases that may be reviewed by a court,
but only to "decid[e] whether a particular interest asserted is deserving of judicial
protection"); Parker & Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 771, 775 (1978) (standing is not related to the issue of balancing judicial,
legislative and executive roles).
9. California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893).
10. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
12. 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), appeal argued, 52 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Feb.
29, 1984) (No. 81-970). See infra pt. III for a discussion of Wright.
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increases the likelihood that that the outcome on the standing issue
will be determined by the Court's desire to maintain control of the
tax-exemption issue. If the Court chooses to defer to executive action
within the guidelines it recently established in Bob Jones University v.
United States,13 the Court will find no standing and thus avoid the
burden of further litigation on the issue. 14 If, on the the other hand,
the Court still distrusts the IRS and wishes to retain judicial control
over the remaining political issues, it will find standing in Wright. In
either case, the decision is more likely to evidence the Court's current
stance on the merits of the tax-exemption question than to contribute
to doctrinal clarity and consistency on the standing issue.
It is the underlying thesis of this Article that had the courts in this
series of cases paid more attention to the fundamental doctrines that
define and limit their role, they would have produced a more coher-
ent and workable body of law to govern the issue of tax exemptions for
racially discriminatory private schools. In addition, the decisions
would not have resulted in contradictory precedents on the standing
and adverseness issues in other types of cases in which the courts are
less inclined to ignore traditional limits on their authority. The oppor-
tunity now exists in Wright v. Regan for the Supreme Court to
reaffirm traditional standing notions or to justify the broader standing
theories used by the lower courts in tax-exemption cases.
I. STANDING IN TAX-BENEFIT CASES
Green v. Kennedy,1 5 the first significant case concerning the tax
treatment of discriminatory private schools, set the tone of judicial
13. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). In Bob Jones
University, the Court held that the Internal Revenue Code requires the IRS to deny
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools. Id. at 2036.
14. The Court's disposition in Bob Jones University of the issue of IRS authority
to promulgate nondiscrimination enforcement standards suggests the likelihood of
such an outcome. In unusually sweeping language, the Court recognized broad IRS
authority to determine what activities are "at odds with the common community
conscience" and thus not eligible for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). 103 S. Ct.
at 2029. The majority noted that "ever since the inception of the tax code, Congress
has seen fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very broad authority to
interpret those laws." Id. at 2031. Consequently, it would be consistent with Bob
Jones University to permit the IRS to establish nondiscrimination enforcement stan-
dards. Speaking against this proposition, of course, is the long history of judicial
activism on this issue. Yet, with its decision in Bob Jones University, perhaps the
Supreme Court is now willing to cede jurisdiction on this matter to the other
branches of government.
15. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green,
398 U.S. 956 (1970).
[Vol. 52.
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disdain for the doctrines of standing and adverseness that was to
characterize this entire line of cases down to the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Bob Jones University. In 1969, the Lawyers Com-
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law (Committee) filed a class action on
behalf of black students and their parents in Mississippi.' 6 The Com-
mittee based this action on constitutional and statutory grounds,
claiming that both the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amend-
ment'7 and section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 8 prohib-
ited the granting of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools.
The District Court for the District of Columbia found that the plain-
tiffs' allegations raised potentially grave constitutional issues and is-
sued a preliminary injunction preventing the IRS from granting tax-
exempt status to such discriminatory private schools.'" This
determination was predicated on the decision of the District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi in Coffey v. State Educational
Finance Commission,20 in which state tuition grants to Mississippi
children attending private segregated schools were held unconstitu-
tional.21' The court in Coffey found that such a system of grants
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
because it "encourages, facilitates, and supports the establishment of a
system of private schools operated on a racially segregated basis." '22
16. Id. at 1129. The Lawyers' Committee describes itself as a:
private tax-exempt non-profit organization dedicated to securing total ac-
ceptance of the concept that all Americans are entitled to equal rights under
law and that lawyers carry out their responsibilities to help solve serious
modern problems through processes of the law. The Committee was formed
in 1963 at the request of the President of the United States.
Lawyers' Committee Press Release, January 13, 1982 at 1 (description of Committee
in Press Release letterhead) [hereinafter cited as Press Release].
17. The due process clause of the fifth amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 3,
has been interpreted to contain a guarantee of equal protection that is functionally
equivalent to that imposed on the states by the express language of the fourteenth
amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
19. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1140 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). The court reasoned that such relief was
proper because "the questions presented.., are grave, and the injury to the moving
party will be certain and irreparable if the application be denied and the final decree
be in his favor." Id. at 1132 (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815
(1929)). Correlative to this, the court held that the plaintiff's interest outweighed any
irreparable injury claimed by the IRS. Id. at 1138. Harm to defendants' interests was
minimized because the injunction was directed only against the issuance of further
ruling letters. Existing tax-exemption rulings were not affected by the injunction. In
regard to future service rulings, "[tihe failure to issue a ruling letter does not preclude
either exemption or deductibility." Id.
20. 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
21. Id. at 1392.
22. Id. Green, unlike Coffey, did not involve outright tuition grants to students
by the state. Instead, the government action at issue was the granting of tax exemp-
tions to segregated schools and the related charitable deduction for contributions to
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In deciding the issue of standing, the Green court did not address
the plaintiffs' assertion of taxpayer standing, but rather relied on
Coffey to find that the plaintiffs had "standing to attack the constitu-
tionality of statutory provisions which they claim [provide] an uncon-
stitutional system of benefits and matching grants that fosters and
supports a system of segregated private schools as an alternative avail-
able to white students seeking to avoid desegregated public schools."2 3
Because the standing issue was never raised in the Coffey case, how-
ever, it is not an authoritative precedent. Thus, we are left with a
naked assertion by the Green court that black school children and
parents had standing to challenge the constitutionality of federal aid
to segregated private schools.
It is difficult to square this flat assertion with any of the admittedly
imprecise traditional standing doctrines. 4 The plaintiffs alleged no
injury in the sense of a denial of an educational opportunity or a
denial of federal financial aid. They had neither attempted to enter
those schools. The court held "this difference to be only a difference of degree." 309
F. Supp. at 1134. But cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) ("The grant
of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of
its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support
the state."); Devins, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: A
Legislative Proposal, 20 Harv. J. on Legis. 153, 163-65 (1983) (asserting that tax
exemptions might be treated as impermissible government aid under civil rights
legislation, but not under the establishment clause). According to the Green court,
tax benefits provided by the Internal Revenue Code result in substantial and signifi-
cant support by the Government of segregated private schools. 309 F. Supp. at 1134.
The court further found that "the lack of segregative purpose on the part of the
Government does not avoid the constitutional issue if the Government action materi-
ally supports a program of school segregation." Id. at 1136. Curiously, the court
suggested that the IRS was blameless for not having changed this policy of granting
tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools. For the court, "[w]hat stops [the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue] from extending disallowance to the schools...
is not unawareness of the significance of deductions, but rather certain legal conclu-
sions, including conclusions as to the scope of his authority under the Code." Id. at
1135. Apparently the court believed that the Commissioner should act only upon an
explicit congressional directive or upon a binding court determination. In other
words, the court envisioned a scheme whereby the judiciary-not the Service-
would have primary authority in interpreting the meaning of the congressionally
enacted Internal Revenue Code.
23. 309 F. Supp. at 1132.
24. For a discussion of the inconsistencies and confusion that have developed in
the area of standing, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-53 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
98-99 (1968); Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 807-08; Nichol, Standing On the Constitu-
tion: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 798, 801 (1983);
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell L. Rev.
663, 663-64 (1977).
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the aided segregated schools nor expressed any desire to attend these
schools. Moreover, there was no allegation that similar federal finan-
cial aid was unavailable to the public schools that the plaintiffs at-
tended. In short, the plaintiffs did not allege that they were the
victims of unequal treatment in the distribution of the federal aid
represented by the tax exemptions. In traditional standing terms,
there was no "injury in fact.12 5
A. Standing Based on Racial Denigration
The finding of standing in Green and the assumption that it existed
in Coffey are apparently the beginnings of an emerging trend to find
that black citizens in general have standing to challenge any govern-
mental action or inaction thought to be in denigration of their race.26
The next manifestation of this judicial sentiment is found in McGlot-
ten v. Connally,27 in which the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that a black plaintiff had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the federal tax exemptions granted to nonprofit
segregated private clubs.2 8 The court upheld the plaintiffs standing on
the grounds that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be pre-
sented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution. '"29 Having decided the standing issue on
these grounds, the McGlotten court concluded that it did not have to
address the plaintiff's claim of taxpayer standing. 3°
25. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-
54 (1970); L. Tribe, supra note 3, § 3-17; Davis, supra note 3, at 450.
26. See Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103
S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
27. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
28. Id. at 452.
29. Id. (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 151-52 (1970)).
30. Id. at 452 n.17. After deciding that the plaintiff had standing, the court held
that, on one hand, racially discriminatory nonprofit private clubs were entitled to
tax-exempt status, while on the other hand, racially discriminatory fraternal orders
were not entitled to tax-exempt status. The court distinguished nonprofit private
clubs from fraternal orders because a tax exemption for nonprofit private clubs was
income defining:
Congress has determined that in a situation where individuals have banded
together to provide recreational facilities on a mutual basis, it would be
conceptually erroneous to impose a tax on the organization as a separate
entity .... No income of the sort usually taxed has been generated; the
money has simply been shifted from one pocket to another, both within the
same pair of pants.
338 F. Supp. at 458. Congress was dissatisfied with this result and, in 1976, amended
the § 501 tax-exemption provision of the Internal Revenue Code explicitly to prohibit
the granting of tax exemptions to discriminatory private clubs. Act of Oct. 20, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 501(i) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). Congress' use of corrective measures to respond to the efforts of the
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By 1973, this notion of standing based on denigration of race in civil
rights cases had proved so appealing that it did not even provoke
discussion when the Supreme Court implicitly accepted it in the case
of Norwood v. Harrison1.3 Black public school students and their
parents challenged the constitutionality of a long-standing state pro-
gram that distributed textbooks to all public and private schools in the
state, including recently formed segregated private schools.3 2 The
plaintiffs did not allege discriminatory motivation on the part of the
state or any deprivation of the benefits of the state program. The
cause of action was simply an attempt to enforce the state's fourteenth
amendment obligation to "steer clear . . . of giving significant aid to
institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination. 33
The three-judge district court, however, found that the plaintiffs had
standing, 34 offering no explanation beyond a casual citation to two
Supreme Court cases that restated abstract principles of standing
doctrine.35 Conspicuously absent was any suggestion that the plaintiffs
were state taxpayers and might have standing as such to enjoin an
allegedly unconstitutional state expenditure. On appeal, the Supreme
Court proceeded directly to a holding for the plaintiffs on the merits3
without a mention of the standing problem so cavalierly disposed of
by the court below.
It appears from this line of standing holdings that to reach the
merits of these cases the courts will accept substantial adverseness on
the plaintiff's part as a substitute for the usual standing requirement of
substantial injury. Because adverseness alone has never been thought
sufficient to confer standing,37 the courts' acceptance of these cases on
that basis constitutes an extraordinary exercise in judicial activism.
The core value embodied in traditioial standing doctrine is a limi-
tation of the role of the courts to protecting the rights of parties whose
interests have actually been injured.38 The primary problem with the
judicial branches of government has proved typical of Congress' refusal to take the
legislative lead on the issue of tax exemptions for private schools.
31. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
32. Id. at 457.
33. Id. at 467.
34. 340 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (N.D. Miss. 1972), vacated and remanded, 413 U.S.
455 (1973).
35. Id. (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)).
36. 413 U.S. at 463-70.
37. " '[T]hat concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues, ...
is the anticipated consequence of proceedings commenced by one who has been
injured in fact; it is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury itself."
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982) (citation omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962)).
38. See supra notes 6-7 and acompanying text.
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notion of standing based on denigration of race in civil rights cases
thus lies in its potentially unlimited applicability. There is no inherent
limitation in the denigration notion that confines it to cases raising
constitutional claims. Racial discrimination by private employers in
violation of applicable federal statutes denigrates the race as emphati-
cally as discrimination by government agencies in violation of the fifth
or fourteenth amendments. Does every black civil rights activist have
standing to bring suit against a private employer, even though he has
never applied for a job with the employer, simply because the discrim-
ination denigrates his race? In addition, even if this peculiar form of
standing is confined to constitutional claims, it is not limited to use by
residents of the state whose actions are being challenged. Does a black
activist group in New York City have standing to challenge discrimi-
natory public housing regulations in California merely because the
California regulations denigrate the race of its members? Under this
theory, state discrimination or state aid to discriminatory private
agencies would be subject to attack by any out-of-state black plaintiff
who objected to the state program. Finally, there is nothing in the
denigration concept that confines it to race and excludes other well-
defined classes. For example, any woman might have standing to
challenge the unequal distribution of athletic resources and opportu-
nities at a state university on the ground that the discrimination
"denigrates her sex," even if she has no interest in athletics and is not a
student at the defendant university.
Even if the notion of standing based on denigration were limited to
resident black plaintiffs bringing constitutional challenges to allegedly
discriminatory state or federal action, it would remain inconsistent
with the traditionally limited role of the courts in the operation of
government. In Jackson v. Dukakis, 39 for example, the First Circuit
addressed the question that the Supreme Court overlooked 40 in Nor-
wood v. Harrison and denied standing to a black plaintiff seeking to
challenge allegedly discriminatory hiring practices of state agencies in
Boston. 41 Although Mr. Jackson was a resident of Boston, the court
held that he did not have a sufficient personal stake in the controversy
to support standing because he had never applied for a job in any of
the challenged agencies. 42 A different result would have been reached
under the denigration of race standard, however, because the racial
discrimination would be viewed as a per se injury to all black citizens,
and thus the plaintiff's lack of a personal stake in the controversy
would be irrelevant.
39. 526 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1975).
40. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
41. 526 F.2d at 65-67.
42. Id. at 65. The claim that the plaintiff suffered emotional and psychological
injury was rejected as conjecture. Id. at 65-66.
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1. The Denigration Standard and Substantive Equal Protection
Possibly the best defense for the amorphous notion of standing
based on racial denigration is that it is a jurisdictional analogue of the
substantive equal protection doctrine that encourages courts to assume
an unusually active role in preventing governmental discrimination
against suspect classes. 43 At least in its inception, the suspect-class
doctrine was based on the view that a majority-dominated legislature
could not be trusted to protect adequately the interests of insular
political minorities, thus justifying an unusual level of judicial inter-
vention in such cases.44 A standing doctrine that facilitates access to
the courts for members of such a class would be a logical corollary of
the substantive doctrine that facilitates judicial intervention on behalf
of the members of the class. This view of the denigration notion would
at least limit such standing to members of those few classes that the
Supreme Court has classified as suspect for substantive equal protec-
tion purposes.45
Lack of clarity in the Court's definition of suspect classes, however,
raises problems in using the suspect-class doctrine as a foundation for
the denigration standard. Reverse race discrimination cases such as
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke4' and reverse sex
discrimination cases such as Craig v. Boren47 suggest that it is the basis
of the classification (such as race or sex) rather than the political
impotence of the disadvantaged class that justifies increased judicial
activism. 4  These characterizations of the suspect-class doctrine
greatly weaken the suggested justification for the denigration basis for
standing. Further, it is unclear which classes qualify as suspect, or
more accurately, just how suspect certain classes are. For example, the
question whether sex discrimination should receive strict judicial scru-
43. See Phillips, Neutrality and Purposiveness in the Application of Strict Scru-
tiny to Racial Classifications, 55 Temple L.Q. 317, 323-26 (1982).
44. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
45. The Supreme Court has labelled as suspect classifications based on race,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954), national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-47 (1948);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and alienage, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-
81 (1979) (using a more lenient standard of review for classifications based on
alienage that are related to basic "governmental function[s]"). Classifications based
on illegitimacy, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769, 776 (1977); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1976), and gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976), have received an intermediate standard of scrutiny. See infra note 49 and
accompanying text.
46. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
47. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
48. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-91 (plurality opinion); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-99.
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tiny has never been adequately addressed by the Supreme Court, and
is even less clear after several recent decisions. 49 Thus, the applicabil-
ity of the denigration standard would be similarly unclear. Finally,
even with respect to black plaintiffs who are clearly members of a
suspect class entitled to strict judicial scrutiny, standing based on
denigration is not limited to individuals who are the victims of the
legislative insensitivity. Thus, application of the denigration notion is
subject to the traditional standing argument-that it would allow
claims to be brought by minority class members who have not in fact
been damaged by the legislature.5 0
2. The Denigration Standard Compared to Standing
in Establishment Clause Cases
The closest analogue to standing based on racial denigration is
standing based on simple adverseness in some establishment clause
cases. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Cam p, ' the Supreme Court suggested in dictum that standing may
arise from non-economic interests and that "[a] person or a family
may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to
give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause
.... "52 Although the case was not decided under the establishment
clause, federal courts seized on this suggestion and applied it in actual
establishment clause cases.5 3
49. The Court came close to applying a strict scrutiny test in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), in which the four justices
joining the plurality agreed that gender should be treated as a suspect classification.
Id. at 682-88. Subsequent cases, however, have settled on an intermediate level of
scrutiny, requiring that gender-based classifications be substantially related to the
achievement of important government objectives. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76,
89 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
50. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
51. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
52. Id. at 154.
53. See, e.g., Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (plaintiff's
beneficial right in having park land maintained for public purposes is sufficient
personal stake to bring establishment clause claim challenging religious use of the
land); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 348 F. Supp. 1170, 1178 (D. Utah 1972)
(plaintiffs' standing upheld based on their "spiritual stake" in establishment clause
values), rev'd on other grounds, 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879
(1973). The Supreme Court had accepted the concept of standing without particular-
ized harm in establishment clause cases dealing with school prayer. School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963) (fact that plaintiff
shows no coercion in school prayer case is not a defense to an establishment clause
claim); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The Establishment Clause ... is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."); see Sutherland,
Establishment According to Engel, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 25, 26-27 (1962). However, the
Court later rejected the generalized harm standard in Valley Forge Christian College
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A constitutional challenge to tax benefits for private segregated
schools is analogous to an establishment clause challenge to state
support of religion and is unlike other equal protection cases because
there is no allegation of any unequal treatment by the state. Plaintiffs
attempt to stop certain institutions from receiving benefits that are
otherwise available to similar institutions. Tax-benefit claims are in
the nature of establishment claims because they allege that the state
aid violates a constitutional prohibition against the "establishment of
segregation." If, on the merits of the case, the court is inclined to
assign an "establishment" meaning to the equal protection clause, it
should not be surprising when the court constructs a basis for standing
analogous to that used in these establishment clause cases. The court
in McGlotten v. Connally54 drew this analogy expressly when it ac-
cepted simple adverseness as a basis for plaintiffs standing to chal-
lenge tax exemptions for segregated private clubs:
Just as "[a] person or family may have a spiritual stake in First
Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues con-
cerning the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause," so a
black American has standing to challenge a system of federal sup-
port and encouragement of segregated fraternal organizations. 55
The holdings in establishment clause cases equating adverseness
with standing, however, have proved to be weak support for the
analogous development of racial denigration as a basis for standing in
civil rights cases. First, the notion of standing without injury never
gained universal acceptance in the establishment clause cases. In sev-
eral cases, federal courts held that plaintiffs had no standing as non-
taxpayers because they had shown no injury in fact.58 Second, the
Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this approach to standing in
the recent establishment clause case of Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State. 7 The Court
found that:
standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or
the fervor of his advocacy. "[T]hat concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues" . . . is the anticipated conse-
quence of proceedings commenced by one who has been injured in
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982). See
infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
54. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
55. Id. at 452 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)).
56. E.g., Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. Denver, 628
F.2d 1289, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981); Swomley v.
Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 (D.D.C. 1981).
57. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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fact; it is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury
itself.58
Thus, the notion of standing based on denigration of race now seems
to be entirely without doctrinal support.
B. Taxpayer Standing
Instead of casually advancing the ill-defined notion of standing
based on racial denigration, the court in Green should have relied on
the established and more analytically defensible concept of taxpayer
standing. In Flast v. Cohen,59 the Supreme Court articulated criteria
for taxpayer standing that could easily cover the situation in Green
and similar cases, given the obvious disposition of the courts to reach
the merits of these cases. The result would have been a finding of
standing on a sound theoretical basis with no more than minor modifi-
cation of existing doctrine, rather than a finding based on the creation
of an entirely new notion. Reliance on Flast in these cases would also
be advantageous because the taxpayer standing doctrine has devel-
oped with significant limitations built into its very terms. In contrast,
standing based on racial denigration seems to contain no inherent
limits on its applicability," ° and no limits have yet been developed by
the courts.
Generally, Flast taxpayer standing requires a finding of "a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated."" It is difficult to imagine a stronger logical nexus than that
between taxpayer status and a claim that tax benefits are being used
unconstitutionally to support racial segregation. More specifically,
Flast requires that two criteria be met to support a finding of taxpayer
standing. First, the taxpayer must be challenging an exercise of Con-
gress' taxing and spending power. 62 An attack on "incidental expendi-
tures of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory
statute" does not meet this requirement. 63 Second, the taxpayer must
allege that the expenditure violates a specific constitutional limitation
on the taxing and spending power, and not simply that the expendi-
ture is beyond the delegated power of Congress.64
It seems obvious that the grant of tax benefits by the IRS pursuant
to its interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code is an exercise of
Congress' taxing and spending power that meets the first Flast crite-
rion. However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Valley Forge
58. Id. at 486 (citations omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).
59. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
60. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
61. 392 U.S. at 102.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 102-03.
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Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State65 renders this point worthy of more than superficial inspection.
In Valley Forge, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW), acting pursuant to specific statutory authority, conveyed
a piece of surplus federal land to a religious college at no cost to the
school. 66 The plaintiff taxpayers sued to enjoin the conveyance on the
ground that it amounted to a transfer of federal financial resources to
subsidize a religious institution in violation of the establishment
clause.6 7 The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing as
taxpayers to bring suit under the Flast doctrine.68 The Court distin-
guished Flast on the grounds that the conveyance in Valley Forge was
an exercise of Congress' property clause power rather than Congress'
taxing and spending power69 and the action was taken by HEW rather
than by Congress directly.70
A finding of taxpayer standing in tax-benefit cases, however, would
not be subject even to the hypertechnical objections used by the
Supreme Court in Valley Forge. The Internal Revenue Code pursuant
to which the IRS acted is the ultimate exercise by Congress of its
taxing power. The IRS is the administrative agency created by Con-
gress to administer the taxing system, and the grant of tax benefits is
the economic equivalent of an expenditure out of tax revenues pursu-
ant to the spending power. 71 In fact, the underlying substantive con-
65. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
66. Id. at 468.
67. Id. at 469.
68. Id. at 476-82.
69. Id. at 480. In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that this distinction is spuri-
ous:
It can make no constitutional difference in the case before us whether the
donation to the petitioner here was in the form of a cash grant to build a
facility ... or in the nature of a gift of property including a facility already
built .... The complaint here is precisely that, although the property at
issue is actually being used for a sectarian purpose, the Government has not
received, nor demanded, full value payment. Whether undertaken pursuant
to the Property Clause or the Spending Clause, the breach of the Establish-
ment Clause, and the relationship of the taxpayer to that breach, is precisely
the same.
Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation and footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 479.
71. As an economic matter, a tax exemption would have to be entirely income-
defining to avoid being characterized as a subsidy. See Yale, Income Tax Deductions
and Credits for Nonpublic Education: Toward a Fair Definition of Net Income, 16
Harv. J. on Legis. 91, 120-21 (1979). Stanley Surrey has labeled exemptions and
other forms of indirect government assistance as tax expenditures which "serve ends
... similar in nature to those served in the same or other areas by direct government
expenditures .... The interplay is such that for any given program involving federal
monetary assistance, the program may be structured to use the tax system to provide
that assistance." Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Neces-
sary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 Harv. L.
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stitutional claim in tax-exemption cases is premised on the economic,
political and constitutional equivalence between direct financial
grants and "tax expenditures" in the form of tax exemptions. 72 Fur-
thermore, insofar as the Supreme Court's objections to taxpayer stand-
ing in Valley Forge grew out of a lack of sympathy for the merits of
the plaintiffs' case,' 3 that factor is not present in tax-benefit cases, in
which the courts from district court to Supreme Court have been
eager to reach the merits of the claims presented.
Rev. 352, 354 (1970). Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, however, have argued that
a tax exemption is different from other forms of government largesse. They contend
that:
Congress has rested income tax exemption on a number of distinct rationales
[including] a lack of fit between the concept of "income" and the objectives
of nonprofit organizations; their meager potential as sources of revenue; the
nuisance of recordkeeping for groups that often operate informally and rely
heavily on voluntary services; and the praiseworthy benevolent spirit ani-
mating such groups.
Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 Yale L.J. 299, 304 (1976). Congress' amendment of the Internal Reve-
nue Code to prohibit the granting of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private
clubs, 26 U.S.C. § 501(i) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), strongly suggests that Congress
regards the social welfare function of groups receiving tax exemptions to be very
important. Congress amended the Code in response to a decision of the District Court
for the District of Columbia which held, in part, that nonprofit private clubs that
excluded nonwhites from membership were entitled to tax-exempt status. McGlotten
v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59 (D.D.C. 1972). See supra note 30.
Courts have also recognized that tax exemptions are the economic equivalent of a
government subsidy. The district court in McGlotten, for example, concluded that
the granting of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory fraternal order is federal
aid under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 461. Similarly, the District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin held that the granting of tax exemptions to organi-
zations that discriminate on the basis of race was significant state action in violation
of the fourteenth amendment. The court found that "tax exemptions . . . obviously
encourage their activities, including racial discrimination, by providing indirect
financial aid." Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 669 (E.D. Wis.
1971). The most recent explication of this view occured in the Supreme Court's
decision in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), in which the
majority stated in its free-exercise analysis that "the governmental interest is in
denying public support to racial discrimination in education." Id. at 2035 n.29
(emphasis added).
72. Many establishment clause claims are similarly premised on the equivalence
between direct financial grants and "tax expenditures" in the form of tax exemptions.
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
789-94 (1973); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855, 858 (1st
Cir. 1980); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 755-56 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (per
curiam), afl'd sub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).
73. The plaintiffs in Valley Forge challenged congressional expenditures as viola-
tive of the establishment clause. Justice Brennan noted in his dissent: "Plainly hostile
to the Framers' understanding of the Establishment Clause. . . the Court vents that
hostility under the guise of standing 'to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs
who. . . are entitled to full consideration of their. . . claims on the merits.' "Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454
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The second requirement for taxpayer standing is that the plaintiffs
allege that the challenged action violates a specific restriction on the
exercise of the taxing and spending power. 4 A finding of standing
based on taxpayer status in Green would thus require a holding that
the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment constitutes a
specific limitation on Congress' taxing and spending power. In Flast,
the Court assumed without explanation that the establishment clause
of the first amendment constituted such a specific limitation.7 While
the Court provided no reasoning to support or refine this conclusion,
it may be argued that all analogous restrictions in the Bill of Rights,
including the due process clause of the fifth amendment, would con-
stitute specific limitations under Flast.76
It is clear that the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amend-
ment77 protects individuals from inequality imposed by Congress in
the exercise of its taxing8 and spending0 powers. Moreover, the
substantive holding of the tax-exemption cases is that the fifth amend-
ment specifically prohibits federal tax expenditures in support of seg-
regation. 0 Thus, it seems that the second Flast requirement is as easily
met in Green as it was in Flast itself. Basing standing in Green on the
plaintiffs' taxpayer status, therefore, would have avoided the creation
of the insupportable notion of racial denigration and the subsequent
contradictions in standing precedent that now exist.81
U.S. 464, 513 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
74. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
75. Id. at 104.
76. See id. at 114 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has not been
helpful in detailing the content of the "specific limitation" requirement established in
Flast. For example, the Court in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974),
stated again without explanation that the statement and account clause of article I is
not the sort of specific limitation contemplated by Flast. Id. at 175. One might
suspect that this unsupported distinction reflects the Court's lack of sympathy for the
plaintiff's attempt in Richardson to spotlight the covert expenditures of the CIA. No
similar lack of sympathy can be expected to block the application of Flast in tax-
benefit cases.
77. See supra note 17.
78. See Taxation With Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 726-31 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
79. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1980) (federal reimbursement of
medical expenses under Medicaid program subject to equal protection limitations).
80. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 459 (D.D.C. 1972); Green v.
Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
81. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
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II. MOOTNESS IN TAX-BENEFIT CASES
A. Green and Revisions in IRS Procedures
Tax-benefit cases have been characterized by claims that changes in
the positions of the parties eliminated the element of adverseness
between the parties and, therefore, rendered their cases moot by the
time they came before courts for review. s2 Procedural changes made
by the IRS and legislative responses in Congress thus have complicated
judicial consideration of the substantive issue of the validity of tax
exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools and have cre-
ated new conflicts concerning the role of the judiciary in this politi-
cally charged area.
Two weeks after its order in Green v. Kennedy,83 the District Court
for the District of Columbia granted a motion to intervene filed by a
class of white parents and their children who attended racially dis-
criminatory private schools in Mississippi. 4 Prior to this motion, how-
ever, the IRS reversed its policy of granting tax exemptions to private
schools that discriminate on the basis of race. 85 The IRS, based on its
changed position, attempted to withdraw and have the case declared
moot. The district court, however, refused to hold the case moot and
instead allowed the intervenors to bring the case to trial. In effect, the
intervenors were permitted to continue to litigate on behalf of a
position which the IRS had voluntarily abandoned in favor of the
plaintiffs' position. The IRS promise to pursue its new policy in ac-
cordance with the plaintiffs' wishes (even if the intervenors succeeded
in establishing the permissibility of the IRS's former position) makes it
difficult to see what constituted the "case or controversy" at this
point.""
82. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
83. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green,
398 U.S. 956 (1970).
84. The Kennedy order was issued on January 12, 1970. Id. On January 21, the
court granted the Motion to Intervene filed by Dan Coit. Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (per
curiam).
85. See IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 6790 (1970). In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Equal
Educational Opportunity, IRS Commissioner Thrower explained that "[a]n organi-
zation seeking exemption as being organized and operated exclusively for educational
purposes ... must meet the tests of being 'charitable' in the common-law sense."
Equal Educational Opportunity: Hearings before the Select Comm. on Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity of the United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1995 (1970)
(statement of Randolph W. Thrower, Comm'r of Internal Revenue) .
86. Plaintiffs, however, believed that the Nixon IRS would be lax in its enforce-
ment of the nondiscrimination requirement. This belief may have been well-
founded. After speaking with IRS Commissioner Randolph Thrower, Mississippi
Republican Party Chairman Clark Reed stated that "[if Mr.] Thrower sticks to his
word... and is sincere in taking action only to offset more extreme court action, no
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The district court's refusal to hold the case moot was, in part, based
on the "doctrine that a defendant does not necessarily moot a case that
is live in its inception by promising to conform to the plaintiffs'
wishes. 817 A defendant may, however, make a case moot by conform-
ing to plaintiffs' position provided there is little possibility of recur-
rence of the dispute.88 The second reason for allowing the case be-
tween the IRS and the plaintiffs to proceed is more significant.
According to the court, the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree that
provided them more relief than that provided by the existing position
of the IRS. s9 After the Service revised its policy to conform to the
plaintiffs' position, the plaintiffs continued to oppose dismissal, sus-
pecting that the Nixon IRS would be unacceptably lax in the enforce-
ment of its newly adopted nondiscrimination requirement.90 Appar-
ently sharing this suspicion, the court devised detailed enforcement
procedures for the IRS, thereby preempting the Service's usual rule-
making process. 91 Undeterred by the lack of an article III case or
private school in Mississippi-or anywhere else I know of-will be without tax-
exempt status for a single day." Both Sides in South Mistrust Nixon Actions on School
Integration, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1970, at 22, col. 1.
87. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1170 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit
v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (per curiam). The intervenors also claimed that the
new IRS policy violated their first amendment freedom of association. The court
specifically rejected their claim in its final disposition of the case. Id. at 1166-68.
However, it conspicuously failed to rely on this new dispute between the intervenors
and the IRS when it refused to find the case moot. With respect to this new
controversy, the original plaintiffs were allied with the IRS against the intenenors.
88. Moore v."Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
376 (1963); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); Note,
Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672, 1682-85 (1970).
In Consumers Union of United States v. Veterans Admin., 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir.
1971), a case relied on by the Green court, the Second Circuit held that a concession
on the part of the federal government that its prior policies ran contrary to statutory
requirements was in itself a sufficient guaranty that there was little chance of
recurrence in that sort of dispute. Id. at 1365. The Court commonly refuses to hold
moot cases in which the controversies presented are "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
89. 330 F. Supp. at 1170.
90. See supra note 86.
91. 330 F. Supp. at 1176. The basis for this judicial rulemaking was the court's
underlying holding that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, discriminating
educational institutions are not entitled to tax exemptions and their contributors are
not entitled to charitable deductions. This determination was based on two distinct
but interrelated rationales. First, the court drew a strong analogy between the law of
charitable trusts and the sections of the Internal Revenue Code being interpreted. Id.
at 1157-58. The court found that "[a]ll charitable trusts, educational or otherwise,
are subject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or
contrary to public policy." Id. at 1159. Because public policy is opposed to segrega-
tive practices, the court concluded that the Internal Revenue Code should not be
read to authorize the grant of tax exemptions to discriminatory schools. Id. at 1164.
Second, the court stated that congressional intent in federal tax law provisions must
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controversy in this regard, the court imposed these procedures on the
IRS by making permanent the preliminary injunction issued in Green
v. Kennedy.92
The injunction issued in Green v. Connally did not, however, bring
an end to the tax exemption controversy93 or even to the litigation
between the parties. 4 The Carter IRS, concerned by the fact that
some private schools adjudicated as being discriminatory still retained
their tax-exempt status, 5 introduced a new proposed revenue proce-
dure that provided a stricter standard for tax exemptions. 96 The proce-
dure would have denied tax-exempt status to private schools that: (1)
be construed not only in accord with the law of charitable trusts, but "in consonance
with the Federal public policy against support for racial segregation of schools,
public or private." Id. at 1163.
92. Id. at 1179-80. Green v. Connally was summarily affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (per curiam). However, the precedential
value of the decision may be severely limited due to the IRS's nonadversarial role in
the case. In fact, the Court explicitly noted in a subsequent decision:
As a defendant in Green, the Service initially took the position that segrega-
tive private schools were entitled to tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), but
it reversed its position while the case was on appeal to this Court. Thus, the
Court's affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case involv-
ing a truly adversary controversy.
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 n.ll (1974). Justice Rehnquist made
much of this footnote in his dissenting opinion to the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Prince Edward School Found. v. United States, 450 U.S. 944, 945 n.1
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). That case involved a private school in Virginia
that had lost its tax-exempt status because it did not satisfy the Service's publication
requirement. The school alleged that it had an open admissions policy, but that no
black students ever sought admission. Justice Rehnquist claimed that the Court ought
to decide Prince Edward because the statutory interpretation issue raised in Green
had not been resolved in a definitive manner. The Court's recent decision in Bob
Jones University did resolve the issue, however, by adopting the Green view that the
tax-exemption provision of the Internal Revenuue Code does not extend to institu-
tions whose policies are in violation of fundamental public policy. 103 S. Ct. at 2029-
31. Justice Rehnquist cast the only dissenting vote in the case. Id. at 2039.
93. The Green decision was criticized by the South Carolina district court in Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 901-07 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639
F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), and by Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent from denial of certiorari in Prince Edward School Found. v. United States,
450 U.S. 944, 945-49 (1981); see also Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious
Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integra-
tion, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 229, 240-44 (1979) (arguing against denial of tax exemp-
tions unless organization acts in a manner clearly contrary to narrowly defined
public policy). The Green rationale, however, was ultimately upheld in Bob Jones
University, 103 S. Ct. at 2034.
94. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
95. See Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979)
(statement of Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
96. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978).
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had been held by a court or agency to be racially discriminatory or (2)
had an insignificant number of minority students and were formed or
substantially expanded at or about the time of desegregation of the
public schools in the community.9 7
Satisfied with existing procedures and critical of the severity of the
new procedure,9 Congress delayed implementation of the proposed
IRS procedure by denying appropriations for its formulation or en-
forcement. Amendments to the Treasury Appropriations Act of 198019
provided that no funds available under the Act could be used to deny
tax exemptions to private schools. 100 This legislation initially served as
a stop-gap measure designed to prevent the Carter IRS from imple-
menting its announced rule change. The administration took the posi-
tion that it was bound by these appropriations amendments to con-
97. Id. at 37,296-97. These standards were similar to the constitutional standards
approved by the Supreme Court in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), a case
that prohibited the granting of state aid to private schools that discriminate on the
basis of race. But unlike the Norwood standard, the proposed procedure numerically
defined an "insignificant minority enrollment" and thus would have virtually estab-
lished racial quotas for these schools. Suspect schools having a student body whose
percentage of minority students is less than 20 % of the minority school age popula-
tion in the community served by the school would lose their tax-exempt status unless
they could increase minority enrollment to at least the 20 % level or make a compel-
ling showing of good faith efforts to attract minority students. Good faith was
defined as satisfaction of four of the following five criteria: (1) availability and
granting of significant minority scholarships; (2) vigorous minority recruitment; (3)
an increased percentage of minority enrollment; (4) employment of minority teachers
or professional staff; and (5) other substantial evidence. Id. at 37,298. Additionally,
the procedure did not distinguish between religious and nonreligious schools, even if
the religious school granted preferences in admission to students of its faith. Id. at
37,298.
98. Following receipt of a record number of hostile comments, the IRS intro-
duced a milder version of the procedure which, unlike the previous proposal, allowed
consideration of special circumstances including the formation or expansion of reli-
gious schools whose denominational beliefs did not mandate racial discrimination. 44
Fed. Reg. 9451, 9453 (1979); see Wilson, An Overview of the I.R.S.'9 Revised
Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organizations, 57
Taxes 515, 515-16 (1979). This proposed procedure retained a numerically-based
definition of "significant minority enrollment," even though exceptions from this
standard were granted in the event of "circumstances which limit the school's ability
to attract minority students." 44 Fed. Reg. at 9453. This vestige of the quota
element, coupled with fears of possible IRS domination over nonpublic education,
led to severe criticism of the revised proposal. See Hearings, supra note 95, at 280-304
(statement of William B. Ball); id. at 971-83 (statement of Rep. Dornan); id. at 725-
29 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
99. Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559 (1979). These riders were annual appropria-
tions measures which require yearly approval by Congress. For House legislative
debates, see 125 Cong. Rec. 18,442-50 (1979) and id. at 18,812-16. For Senate
debates, see id. at 22,922-28 and id. at 23,204-10.
100. The Dornan amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 615, 93 Stat. 559, 577 (1979),
provided that "[n]one of the funds available under [the] Act may be used to carry out
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tinue implementing the existing procedures. As a result, the original
plaintiffs in Green v. Connally sought enforcement of the permanent
injunction. 1 1
The adverseness of the parties again became the decisive issue in the
case. The plaintiffs in Green sought, on statutory and constitutional
grounds, to force the IRS to adopt procedures that were functionally
equivalent to those proposed by the Carter IRS.10 2 Moreover, the
Carter administration had announced that it would implement its
proposed procedures as soon as the appropriations restrictions
lapsed. 0 3 Despite the apparent lack of adverseness between the gov-
ernment and the civil rights plaintiffs, the district court allowed the
case to proceed through trial because the case presented at least
technically adverse parties. The administration's stated intention to
conform to the appropriations restrictions,104 as well as its general
duty to defend the constitutionality of congressional legislation, 10 5
provided sufficient adverseness for the case to continue.
[the IRS proposals]." Id. The Ashbrook amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93
Stat. 559, 562 (1979), provided more generally that no funds may be used "to
formulate or carry out any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, regulation, standard,
or measure which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private, religious, or
church-operated schools." Id.
101. Motion For An Order Substituting Parties Defendant, to Enforce Decree and
for Further Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, Green v. Miller, No. 69-1355, slip
op. (D.D.C. May 5, 1980).
102. In fact, the revenue procedures proposed by the IRS in 1978 represented a
negotiated settlement betveen the Carter Justice Department and the Lawyer's
Committee. See 127 Cong. Rec. H5394-95 (daily ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of Rep.
Dornan). If anything, the procedures exceeded those sought by the plaintiffs in
Green. Unlike the Carter proposal, the plaintiffs in Green did not seek to impose
racial quotas on Mississippi private schools eligible for tax-exempt status. Compare
the proposals discussed supra at notes 97-98 with Motion for an Order Substituting
Parties Defendant, to Enforce Decree and for Further Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, Green v. Miller, No. 69-1355, slip op. (D.D.C. May 5, 1980).
103. The Carter IRS's refusal to repudiate its proposed revenue procedures was
one of the factors leading to the 1980 re-enactment of the Ashbrook amendment. See
126 Cong. Rec. 22,167 (1980) ("The revenue procedures.., constitute.., an ever-
present threat as long as the current administration remains in office.") (remarks of
Rep. Ashbrook). Indeed, the government suggested to the court in a related case that
those appropriations restrictions which presently bind the Executive "may be over-
come only by a court . . . either declaring the riders unconstitutional or, in the
alternative, interpreting the riders narrowly, to permit the implementation of new,
more stringent rules in this area." Response of Defendants to Second Supplemental
Memorandum of Intervenor Wayne Allen in Support of Motion to Dismiss and
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 9,
Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Response].
104. See Response, supra note 103, at 8. The administration considered the restric-
tions to be as binding as specific substantive legislation on the matter. See id.
105. The force of this obligation, however, is open to some question. On at least
one occasion counsel for Congress appeared in the Supreme Court by authority of a
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Based in part on the lackluster defense presented by the Carter
Justice Department, the district court upheld the plaintiffs' claim in
Green v. Miller.0 6 In June 1980, the court formally adopted the
plaintiffs' statutory argument by characterizing as presumptively dis-
criminatory Mississippi private schools that (1) had been adjudged to
be racially discriminatory or (2) were established or expanded at the
time of public school desegregation and could not demonstrate that
they did not practice racial discrimination. 07
B. The Executive Branch Defers to the Courts-
Bob Jones University v. United States
The laxity with which the Green court addressed the adverseness
requirement was followed by similar Court action in Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States. 08 In 1976, the IRS applied the then-existing
revenue procedures to revoke Bob Jones University's tax exemption
because the school employed racially discriminatory practices.109 The
University promptly filed suit in federal court to establish its statutory
and constitutional right to reinstatement of its tax exemption. In April
1981, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the Univer-
sity's contentions, holding that the Internal Revenue Code authorized
the IRS to deny a tax exemption to institutions engaged in racial
discrimination and that such denial did not violate the University's
first amendment rights."11
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bob Jones University and
in Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, a companion case
presenting identical issues."' In 1982, however, the Reagan adminis-
tration announced that "without further guidance from Congress, the
Internal Revenue Service will no longer revoke or deny tax-exempt
joint resolution to argue as amicus curiae in support of a statute under attack after
the Solicitor General joined in two of the challenging party's arguments. See United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 304 (1946).
106. No. 69-1355, slip op. (D.D.C. May 5, 1980). Not suprisingly, the IRS de-
clined the opportunity to appeal this "technically adverse" decision.
107. Id. at 2. The House of Representatives later reconsidered and reapproved the
Ashbrook and Dornan amendments. See 126 Cong. Rec. 21981-90, 22166-70 (1980).
Unlike the initial passage, the House decision was made against the backdrop of
Green v. Miller, and severe criticism of the role of the courts and the Carter IRS in
that case. See 126 Cong. Rec. 21,978 (1980). The scope of the Ashbrook amendment
was later expanded to preclude enforcement of court orders that required stricter
nondiscrimination enforcement standards than those in place at the time of the
Carter proposal. See 127 Cong. Rec. H5392-98 (daily ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of
Rep. Ashbrook).
108. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
109. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D.S.C. 1978),
rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
110. 639 F.2d at 155.
111. 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
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status for . . .organizations on the grounds that they don't conform
with certain fundamental public policies."" 2 On the same day, the
Justice Department petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate as moot,
in light of the new administration policy, the Bob Jones University
and Goldsboro Schools cases."13
Immediately following its reversal of the long-standing IRS policy,
the administration became the object of a barrage of criticism from
newspapers 1 4 and civil rights groups. 115 In the wake of such severe
criticism, the President-in order to show his "unalterable opposition
to racial discrimination in any form"" 6-sent legislation to Congress
that would have prohibited the granting of tax exemptions to racially
discriminatory organizations." 7 Congress, however, refused to enact
the legislation claiming that its position was already well settled."18
The administration ultimately returned to the Supreme Court and
requested that the Bob Jones case be decided. 1 9
112. I.R.S. News Release at 1 (Jan. 8, 1982).
113. See Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2025 n.9.
114. See, e.g., Race Bias Won't Bar Tax-Exempt Status For Private Religious
Schools, U.S. Says, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1982, at 12, col. 2; U.S. Drops Rule on Tax
Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at Al, col. 2.
115. Immediately subsequent to the Reagan policy shift, the Lawyer's Committee
sought to use Green as a vehicle to obtain an injunction preventing the Reagan
administration from implementing its announced policy shifts. In papers filed before
the district court, the Lawyer's Committee argued "that the announced shift violates
the court orders against IRS and Treasury in the Green case and that they are entitled
to a further injunction to protect the relief they have already won." Press Release,
supra note 16, at 2. The Committee recognized that the Green decision was limited
to the State of Mississippi, yet it believed that the issuance of a nationwide injunction
would be proper because the court's analysis in Green was not limited to the state of
Mississippi. The district court properly denied this request, holding that its jurisdic-
tion through Green was limited to the state of Mississippi. See Exemptions Bill
Assailed at Hearing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1982, at A12, col. 1. The Lawyer's Com-
mittee was also unsuccessful in its efforts to argue the Bob Jones University case
before the Supreme Court by having the Green case joined with Bob Jones.
116. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House Transmitting Proposed Legislation, 18 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doe. 37 (Jan. 18, 1982).
117. Id. "Also, on January 18, 1982, the Treasury Department announced that the
Secretary of the Treasury has instructed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue not to
act on any applications for tax-exempt status filed in response to the new Treasury
policy announced on January 8, 1982, except in the cases of Bob Jones University and
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., until Congress has acted on the proposed legisla-
tion." Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Background Relating
to the Effect of Racially Discriminatory Policies on the Tax-Exempt Status of Private
Schools at 7 (joint Comm. Print 1982).
118. See 128 Cong. Rec. S111 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Bradley);
id. at S108 (remarks of Sen. Hart); see also Devins, supra note 22, at 161-63.
119. See Administration Asks High Court to Settle School Exemption Issue, Wash.
Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at A3, col. 4; Schools Tax Issue Put to High Court in Shift by
Reagan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
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The government argued, however, in accord with the plaintiffs'
position, that the IRS was statutorily required to grant tax exemptions
to the schools. To provide some semblance of a case or controversy
within the Court's jurisdiction, the government suggested that the
Court appoint "counsel adversary" to the schools on this underlying
issue. 120 The Court complied with this unorthodox request and ap-
pointed William T. Coleman, Jr. to argue the "government's side" in
these cases, 12' thus permitting the case to proceed despite its clear
inability to satisfy the adverseness requirement. 2 2
Judicial involvement in this case served simply to transfer to the
Court the apparent responsibility for a politically controversial issue
that was no longer ripe for judicial resolution. Ironically, the Reagan
administration has rebuked the federal courts for engaging in precisely
this type of judicial legislation. According to Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith:
Responsibility for policy making in a democratic republic must
reside in those who are directly accountable to the electorate....
When courts fail to exercise self-restraint and instead enter the
political realms reserved to the elected branches, they subject
themselves to the political pressure endemic to that arena and
invite popular attack. 12 3
The Attorney General, not surprisingly, remained silent on the
Court's political activism in the matter of Bob Jones University's tax
exemption.
120. Administration Asks High Court to Settle School Exemption Issue, Wash.
Post., Feb. 26, 1982, at A3, col. 4. "Counsel adversary" have been appointed by the
Court in other cases. In Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955), the
Court set forth the standard that it would use in the appointment of counsel adver-
sary:
In view of the lack of genuine adversary proceedings at any stage in this
litigation, the outcome of which could have far-reaching consequences on
domestic relations throughout the United States, the Court invited specially
qualified counsel "to appear and present oral argument, as amicus curiae,
in support of the judgment below."
Id. at 4 (quoting Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 348 U.S. 885 (1954)); see, e.g.,
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 47 n.1 (1982); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S.
206, 210 n.9 (1968).
121. 456 U.S. 922 (1982).
122. See Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1971)
("[c]onfronted with the anomaly that both litigants desire precisely the same result,
[the Court holds that there is] no case or controversy within the meaning of Art[icle]
III .... "). The Court ultimately held that the IRS had properly revoked Bob Jones
University's tax-exempt status as a charitable institution, because its discriminatory
actions were against public policy. Id. at 2032.
123. Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A.J. 59, 60 (1982).
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III. Wright v. Regan: THE ANALYTICAL DEcTs
OF Green RETutn
The failure of Congress and the Executive to formulate a clear
policy on the issue of tax exemptions, and the corresponding failure of
the Supreme Court to establish and follow standards to govern stand-
ing and adverseness, have resulted in continuing litigation in this area.
The most recent case in the tax-benefit line, Wright v. Regan,2 4 will
provide the Court an opportunity to clarify its position on standing in
tax-benefit cases as well as reveal its willingness to continue its trend
of judicial activism.
Wright represents the efforts of black students and parents to im-
pose Green v. Miller nondiscrimination enforcement standards on the
IRS, but the litigation has thus far focused on the threshold issue of the
court's constitutional power to decide the substantive issues. The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held in Wright v. Miller'2 5
that plaintiffs were barred from bringing such an action because their
generalized denigration of race theory was insufficient to create stand-
ing and because the plaintiffs and the IRS were not sufficiently ad-
verse. 126 The court of appeals, in Wright v. Regan,12 7 reversed the
district court decision on both grounds, 28 and the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on the standing issue.129
A. Standing
Relying on traditional standing doctrine, the district court held that
the plaintiffs in Wright did not assert a "distinct, palpable, and
concrete injury,' 30 because they did not allege that any of the named
schools had actually discriminated against any of the plaintiffs. '3' A
school can only discriminate against individuals by denying admission
or by unfairly treating enrolled students. In holding that such a school
does not interfere with the rights of the general public, the district
court in effect rejected the racial denigration notion as a basis for
standing. The court of appeals, however, reversed the lower court's
decision and adopted the plaintiffs' position that, as members of the
124. 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
125. 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d
820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
126. Id. at 793-97. In addition, the district court found that the doctrine of
nonreviewability of administrative action prevented the court from reversing a deci-
sion of the Commissioner of the IRS, id. at 797-98, and that the Ashbrook and
Dornan amendments functioned as substantive amendments precluding judicial in-
tervention. Id. at 798-99.
127. 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
128. Id. at 827-28.
129. 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
130. 480 F. Supp. at 793.
131. See id. at 794.
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group subjected to the discrimination, they had standing to sue to
enforce the government's constitutional obligations to "steer clear" of
giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial discrimina-
tion. 13
2
The plaintiffs' reliance on the questionable notion of standing based
on denigration of race leaves their status in the case open to vigorous
attack. In its petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari in Wright,
the government argues:
Respondents' asserted right to be free of government aid to racial
discrimination is an undifferentiated right common to all members
of the public that will not support standing to sue Treasury officials
in an Article III court .... The fact that respondents may have an
interest in a matter that they have sought to identify as a public
issue, and that they may share certain attributes common to per-
sons who may have suffered discrimination at the hands of private
schools, is an insufficient ground upon which to conclude that they
have been injured in fact by such discrimination or that the Secre-
tary's allegedly illegal conduct has actually caused such discrimina-
tion. 3
3
This is precisely the position that the Supreme Court adopted in
Valley Forge on the question of standing to bring establishment clause
claims. According to the Court in Valley Forge, "the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees [is not] an injury sufficient to confer standing
under Art[icle] III, even though the disagreement is phrased in consti-
tutional terms."' 1 34 Thus, it now seems that plaintiffs' standing in
Wright can be saved only if the Court can create a distinction between
their "establishment of segregation" claim and the establishment of
religion claim in Valley Forge. Such a result is unwarranted and
unlikely in light of the Court's narrow approach to the standing
doctrine in Valley Forge. Had the plaintiffs and the court of appeals
relied on Flast taxpayer standing doctrine, as suggested earlier, 35
their prospects would not be so unsure.
132. 656 F.2d at 830. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). As noted earlier, the Supreme Court seemed
simply to assume the existence of standing in Norwood without any discussion of the
issue. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36. Thus, the precedential value of
Norwood on the standing issue is weak. Unlike the court in Wright, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, in Jackson v. Dukakis, 526 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1975),
chose to ignore Norwood when it found no standing on facts similar to those in
Norwood and Wright. Id. at 65. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
133. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Regan v. Wright, No. 81-970, at 15 (Nov. 23, 1981)
(citation omitted).
134. 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).
135. See supra pt. I(B).
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B. Adverseness of Parties
Recognizing that "the named adversary parties in this action, the
parents of the black public school children and the [IRS], seem closely
allied in terms of the need to promulgate future guidelines,"'' 36 the
district court held that the case-or-controversy requirement of article
III was not met, and therefore, that plaintiffs could not justify their
need for seeking a judicial remedy. 137 This point was rejected by the
court of appeals, which noted that the IRS had vigorously and success-
fully litigated the action in the lower court and that the participation
of an intervenor assured that the issue would be adjudicated with the
requisite adverseness.131
The court of appeals position on the parties' adverseness is sup-
ported by two additional points. Based on the standard employed in
Green v. Miller, the Carter administration was at least technically
adverse to the civil rights plaintiffs. 1 39 Moreover, any possible alliance
between plaintiffs and defendants had dissipated by the time the court
of appeals heard oral arguments in Wright, due to President Reagan's
election and the consequent shift in Treasury policies on this matter. 140
C. Political Considerations and Bob Jones University
Had the Supreme Court refused to hear the Bob Jones University
case, attention would have focused on Wright v. Regan, a case in
which adverseness is clear and in which the plaintiffs' standing could
be asserted on taxpayer grounds. The government argues in Wright
that the plaintiffs lack standing, not only because their theory of racial
denigration is invalid, but also because "the appropriate forum for
such a debate concerning the correctness of Treasury policy is in the
Congress pursuant to the exercise of its oversight of the Department of
the Treasury and not in the courts.1114 If the Supreme Court accepts
this argument and holds that the plaintiffs in Wright are without
standing, it will be guilty of the ultimate irony. The Court will have
extended its jurisdiction unnecessarily to reach an issue raised in the
moot case of Bob Jones University while refusing jurisdiction over the
same issue when presented by truly adverse parties in Wright.
A refusal by the Court to hear Bob Jones University would have
caused the policy issue to revert initially to the political arena. The
Reagan administration would have been confronted with the question
136. 480 F. Supp. at 796 (referring to the Carter IRS's 1978 proposal).
137. Id. at 797.
138. 656 F.2d at 828.
139. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
141. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Regan v. Wright, No. 81-970, at 21 (Nov. 23, 1981).
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whether to pursue its announced intention to revise IRS policies and
allow the grant of an exemption to Bob Jones University. 142 If the IRS
had decided to grant the exemption, Congress would have been forced
to decide whether to allow such a course of action or to statutorily
reverse the IRS policy decision. If Congress chose not to reverse such a
decision by the IRS, the stage would have been set for a constitutional
challenge to what would then be clearly defined congressional and
executive policy. The Wright suit, presenting parties clearly adverse to
the Reagan administration on the issue, would have provided an
appropriate vehicle for a judicial determination of the constitutional
question.
When the Court was asked by the Reagan administration to hear
Bob Jones University, it should have responded as the Court re-
sponded in 1793 to a request from Secretary of State Jefferson for an
advisory opinion on certain policy questions confronting President
Washington's administration. On August 8, 1793, Chief Justice Jay
wrote to President Washington:
We exceedingly regret every event that may cause embarrassment
to your administration, but we derive consolation from the reflec-
tion that your judgment will discern what is right, and that your
usual prudence, decision, and firmness will surmount every obsta-
cle to the preservation of the rights, peace, and dignity of the
United States. 143
IV. LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE AND THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL
CONTROL OVER THE TAX-EXEMPTION ISSUE
After a few stirring attempts to assert control over the course of
national policy with respect to tax benefits for private segregated
schools, Congress seems finally to have surrendered. Recent congres-
sional inactivity on the issue has allowed the courts to assume the
legislative policy initiative.
On one hand, Congress failed to respond to the policy shift by the
Reagan administration by declining to amend the Internal Revenue
Code to clearly prohibit the granting of such tax exemptions and
refusing even to ratify a concurrent resolution stating that "current
Federal law clearly authorizes and requires the Internal Revenue
142. The administration, however, could have delayed this decision for some time
due to the Court of Appeals' issuance of a temporary injunction in Wright. This
injunction prohibits the IRS from granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
schools until final resolution of Wright. Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 18, 1982) (order granting injunction).
143. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 66 (2d ed. 1973) (quoting Letter of Chief
Justice Jay and the Associate Justices to President Washington, Aug. 8, 1793).
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Service to deny tax-exempt status ... to private schools that discrimi-
nate on the basis of race.' 44 This congressional inertia was due, in
part, to the fact that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
had issued an injunction prohibiting the granting of tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory private schools pending final determination of
Wright v. Regan.145 In addition, President Reagan had announced
that for an indefinite period of time, he would not permit the IRS to
grant tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools. 46
On the other hand, Congress also refused to re-enact the amend-
ments that had previously limited the scope of IRS enforcement of the
racial nondiscrimination requirement. 47 Congress' failure to re-enact
these measures can be attributed to two factors. First, the Reagan
Treasury Department withdrew the Carter administration proposal
that had spurred the initial passage and later reaffirmation of these
amendments. 14 Second, Congress wished to wait for the Supreme
Court's forthcoming decision in Bob Jones University rather than take
the lead on the tax-exemption issue. 49
Congressman Dornan reintroduced the amendments claiming that
"as a result of [Wright v. Regan] the way has been paved for a possible
ruling ... which would implement significant parts of the
... procedures forbidden by my amendment and which may
threaten the tax-exempt status of every private and religious school in
the Nation."' 5 Despite the fact that Congressman Dornan's words
were no less valid than they were in the three prior years in which his
amendment was passed, the House of Representatives declined to re-
enact this measure. The sentiment in Congress had shifted to a belief
that the tax-exemption issue had become a sensitive constitutional one
that was beyond the scope of the legislature.151
Thus, not only are the courts overly inclined to assume legislative
responsibility for the issue of tax benefits for segregated schools, but
144. 128 Cong. Rec. S108 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Hart).
145. See supra note 142.
146. See supra note 117.
147. 128 Cong. Rec. H8615-23 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep.
Dornan),
148. See 128 Cong. Rec. H8616 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep.
Roybal).
149. See infra note 151.
150. 128 Cong. Rec. H8615 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Dornan).
151. 128 Cong. Rec. H8616 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Roybal)
("Congress ought not interject itself at this time in an issue that is currently pending
in the courts."); id. (remarks of Rep. Rangel) ("this very sensitive constitutional
question is presently before the U.S. Supreme Court [and members of Congress who
want to enact the Dornan amendment] are extending this question beyond the scope
of this Congress."); id. at H8617 (remarks of Rep. Matsui) ("Members of this body
should wait until the Court resolves this matter .... ); id. at H8618 (remarks of
Rep. Fazio) ("I think the House would not want to go on record at this time as
anticipating a Supreme Court decision.").
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like the executive branch in Bob Jones University, Congress now seems
content to defer to the legislative judgment of the courts on this
politically sensitive subject. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Bob Jones University only encourages this tendency of Congress to
avoid the issues by relying on an activist judiciary. The Court disposed
of the lingering statutory interpretation question by holding that the
tax-exemption provisions of the Internal Revenue Code do not extend
to institutions whose practices violate a fundamental public policy
against racial discrimination. 5 2 The political respite that this decision
provides for Congress and the Executive may prove only temporary,
however, because the decision merely establishes that tax-exempt
schools cannot explicitly maintain racially discriminatory policies.
How the IRS ought to implement this nondiscrimination requirement
is an issue that has yet to be resolved in a definitive manner.
CONCLUSION
The IRS has reinstated the procedures in force prior to the Reagan
administration's policy swing in favor of Bob Jones University. These
are essentially the 1975 enforcement procedures adopted by the IRS in
response to the Green v. Connally decision and preserved from pro-
posed change by congressional action in 1978. The core of the plain-
tiffs' claim in the pending Wright v. Regan lawsuit, however, is that
these procedures do not go far enough toward establishing presump-
tions against suspect schools. Thus, a grant of standing in Wright may
ultimately result in a set of detailed procedures for IRS enforcement of
the provision that the Supreme Court wrote into the Internal Revenue
Code in Bob Jones University. Such a result would run counter to the
strongly expressed wishes of Congress and the Executive on the matter
and would surely elicit a sincere outcry against judicial activism from
both branches. More importantly, a finding of standing in Wright
152. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2030-31 (1983). The
Court, in unusually sweeping language, stated that "[c]haritable exemptions are
justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit which
the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax
revenues. . . .The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common
community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be
conferred." Id. at 2028-29 (footnote omitted). Bob Jones University was not entitled
to tax-exempt status under this standard because "an educational institution engaging
in practices affirmatively at odds with [the government's] declared position [on racial
discrimination] cannot be seen as exercising a 'beneficial and stabilizing influence in
community life.' " Id. at 2032 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673
(1970)). For a discussion of the Bob Jones University case, see Calvin & Devins, A
Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1353
(1983).
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based on racial denigration would authoritatively enshrine this anom-
alous and open-ended notion in the already murky body that controls
standing to sue. Yet, the history of judicial activism and congressional
and executive abdication of responsibility on the issue of tax exemp-
tions clearly encourages such continued judicial activism. Congress
and the Executive may yet discover that they have paid an unaccept-
ably high price for the convenience of passing a politically sensitive
subject to a judiciary that has been all too willing to supply the
requisite political judgment.
